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Abstract—Automated static analysis tools can perform 
efficient thorough checking of important properties of, and 
extract and summarize critical information about, a source 
program.  This paper evaluates three open-source static 
analysis tools; Flawfinder, Cppcheck and Yasca.  Each tool 
is analyzed with regards to usability, IDE integration, 
performance, and accuracy.  Special emphasis is placed on 
the integration of these tools into the development 
environment to enable analysis during all phases of 
development as well as to enable extension of rules and other 
improvements within the tools.  It is shown that Flawfinder 
be the easiest to modify and extend, Cppcheck be inviting to 
novices, and Yasca be the most accurate and versatile. 
 




HE demand for reliable, quality software has grown 
in all areas, from consumer and business applications 
to mission-critical commercial, industrial and 
governmental applications.  It is however not feasible to 
exhaustively test all possible executions and to remove all 
potential risks from large complex software product.   
However, the use of automated software analysis tools 
has enabled organizations to produce products that are as 
defect free as practically possible.  Automated analysis, 
while not a replacement for human effort, is a substantial 
aid to developers particularly where software quality is of 
primary importance [13].  Automated software analysis 
tools can perform efficient and thorough checking of 
various properties, and can extract and summarize critical 
information of the source program.   
 
There are two main categories of automated software 
analysis tools: dynamic and static. Dynamic analysis is 
performed at runtime on the executable images of the 
software.  Tests are conducted on specific behaviors, such 
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as memory corruption, memory leaks and race conditions, 
of software during execution.  Since defects will not be 
discovered until late in the software development 
lifecycle, dynamic analysis can be costly.  On the other 
hand, static analysis tools perform analysis on source 
code or byte code modules.  It does not require any 
instrumentation or development of test cases, and can be 
utilized upon the availability of the code.  Static analysis 
tools can go through all paths of the code and uncover 
significantly more and wider range of defects, including 
detect logic errors, dead code, security vulnerabilities, and 
so on. 
 
Static analysis techniques range widely.  Simple style 
checkers identify poorly written code that may violate 
coding standards or consistency rules.  Bug pattern 
checkers search for common error patterns not caught by 
the compiler, such as memory leaks and out of bounds 
errors.  Dataflow and control flow analysis techniques, 
which can apply intra-procedurally or inter-procedurally, 
use annotations to reduce the occurrence of false positives.  
Model checkers test whether the software meets 
specification.  Formal methods apply mathematical 
techniques to perform in-depth analysis for more accurate 
results. Other techniques, such as data mining, have also 
been successful in implementing static analysis.   
 
Static analysis tools each deploys selected technique 
and exhibits unique features. FindBugs [8], [9], [10] and 
XFindBugs [16] implement bug pattern matching.  They 
perform effective analysis and keep the false positive rate 
low.  They offer an intuitive user interface and friendly 
reporting mechanism.  However, FindBugs and 
XFindBugs can detect only limited types of software 
defects and has to make trade-offs in order to achieve low 
false positive or false negative rates.  ESC/Java [6] uses 
modular checking with the help of annotated code, and 
provides more formal theorem-proving techniques.  While 
it aims to reach some middle ground of cost vs. usability, 
ESC/Java requires developers to set up annotations for 
each routine.  DSD-Crasher [5] adopts a dynamic-static-
dynamic hybrid approach.  In the first step, dynamic 
inference, DSD-Crasher captures the execution behavior 
and detects program invariants dynamically.  Secondly, a 
static analysis is performed to exhaustively analyze the 
program paths within the restricted input domain.  Lastly, 
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in dynamic verification, test cases are automatically 
generated to test the results of the static analysis.  DSD-
Crasher inherits the limitation of dynamic analysis, and is 
limited by the paths designated in the applied test cases.  
CP-Miner [12] implements data mining to find replicated 
code in large software suites.  Due to its significant 
overhead in the implementation of data mining techniques, 
CP-Miner is more suitable for large developments.  
Abstract interpretation [2], [3] is a mathematics-based 
formal method.  It is commonly used for mission-critical 
embedded systems in avionics, aerospace, railway and 
automotive industries.  Abstract interpretation techniques 
have been applied to memory usage analysis, timing 
analysis, bug finding, inter- and intra-procedural analyses 
including control flow and data flow analysis, stack 
analysis, and more [2], [3], [4], [7], [11], [14], [17], [18].  
Earlier research showed evaluations for avionics industry 
[1] and for detecting buffer overflow vulnerabilities [19].   
 
In this paper, three relatively new and open source 
static analysis tools are studies.  Section 2 introduces 
these three tools and test platforms.  In section 3, test 
cases and results are presented.  Section 4 concludes with 
future work. 
 
II. STATIC ANALYSIS TOOLS AND PLATFORM 
Among all available open source static analysis tools 
for the C/C++ language, three were identified based upon 
their ease of use, report method, result interpretation, 
installation, user interface, extensibility, and IDE 
integration.   They are Flawfinder, Cppcheck, and Yasca.   
 
Flawfinder [25] is an open-source static analysis tool.  
It was developed in Python, and designed to detect 
security vulnerabilities in C and C++ source code.  
Flawfinder was written primarily in Python, requires the 
installation of both Python and Cygwin, and can run in 
Linux/Unix and Windows.  Flawfinder is a command line 
tool that is simple and intuitive to use.  Flawfinder rates 
potential security flaws, called hits, from level 0 (very 
little risk) to level 5 (high risk).  By default the program 
reports only flaws with a minimum risk level of 1, but the 
user has the option of selecting the minimum level.  There 
are various filtering options. 
The output of the analysis is limited to HTML or 
plain text file formats.  Reports provide mostly standard 
information, including filename, line numbers and types 
of the flaws, and remediation advice. 
   
Cppcheck [23] is a standalone, and open source, 
static analyzer.  Cppcheck was written in C++ and can 
analyze C/C++ code for common defects such as memory 
leaks.  Cppcheck is designed to promise a low false 
positives rates.  Its setup in Windows is straightforward.  
Cppcheck has four levels of severity: error, possible error, 
style, possible style. By default, only errors are reported.  
Cppcheck provides both the command line and GUI 
usages.  The command line usage can specify warning 
levels, output format/template, etc.  The GUI usage 
supports seven languages.  While the GUI usage is 
friendlier, the command line usage is more versatile.    
 
Yasca is a command line open source static analysis 
tool designed to assist in quality assurance testing and 
vulnerability scanning.  It was developed with Java and 
PHP.  This tool is an aggregation of the Yasca core 
software and various open source tools embedded in 
Yasca.  It includes plug-ins for Antic, ClamAV, Grep, 
Jlint, Javascriptlint, Fxcop, Findbugs, Findbugs-plugin, 
Grep, Rats, PMD, Pixy, Phplint, Cppcheck, Clamav.  
Since this paper focuses on C/C++ source code, only the 
Antic, ClamAV, Grep, Rats and Cppcheck plug-ins were 
enabled.  The Yasca core itself is not meant to be 
modified except as an official release; however the plug-
ins can be modified as needed.  Yasca is fairly intuitive to 
use.  Yasca does not offer as many options as Flawfinder 
or Cppcheck, but does provide flexible output formats 
including that of MySQL. 
 
These three tools are to be evaluated on a set of 
carefully selected test cases, which are embedded with 
various classes of flaws.  The primary IDE in this project 
is Eclipse [24].   It is chosen for its versatility, ease of use, 
and wide acceptance in industry and education 
environments.  Eclipse has the native support of Java, and 
can support other languages with corresponding plug-ins.  
Other supporting utilities include version control tool 
Subversion [20], [21], [26], [27] and Visual C++ IDE.   
 
III. TEST CASES AND EVALUATIONS 
Source code analyzed in this project is freely 
available online from the National Institute of Standards 
and Technology (NIST) Software Assurance Metrics And 
Tool Evaluation (SAMATE) Project [15].    This paper 
used SAMATE Test Suites 9, 45, 46, 47, 57, 58, and 59, 
with a total of 225 C/C++ source code files (test cases).  
Many of these test cases include both a bad version (with 
flaws or weaknesses) and a good version (with flaws or 
weaknesses removed).  These 225 cases represent twenty-
three Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) flaw 
classes [22].    
 
Within this set of test cases, virtually all could be 
classified as potential security vulnerabilities under 
various circumstances.  137 cases represent high or very 
high security risks.  There are 32 code injection 
vulnerabilities (command, XSS, SQL, and resource 
injection).  Injection vulnerabilities can allow attackers to 
compromise the system.   There are 20 buffer overflow 
(heap and stack) vulnerabilities.  Buffer overflows 
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represent a serious threat to system stability and security, 
and have been the target of a multitude of attacks in 
recent years.  There are 5 cases of uncontrolled format 
strings.  Uncontrolled format strings can cause buffer 
overflow in some instances.  There are 11 test cases that 
can cause memory leaks.  125 cases can lead to invalid or 
corrupted data, or data loss (without a malicious attack 
present).  Nearly all weaknesses can cause the system to 
crash or hang.  Quality issues like data errors and memory 
leaks can lead to system freeze up or crash.  Also of great 
concerns are errors that cause the program to display 
erroneous information.  In life-safety situations, such as 
medical, aviation, and automotive fields, these errors can 
TABLE I 
TEST CASES AND RISKS 
Weakness Test Cases  Bad Good Description Risks 
CWE-078 18  10 8 Command Injection (OS) High security risk. 
Malicious attack - read/modify data, execute commands. 
CWE-079 16 8 8 Cross-site Scripting (XSS) 
Injection (Web-based) 
Very high security risk. 
Malicious attack -inject malicious script execution. 
CWE-089 13 6 7 SQL Injection (DB Server) Very high security risk. 
Malicious attack - read/modify/delete sensitive data including 
username/password 
CWE-099 16 8 8 Resource Injection (System) High security risk. 
Malicious attack - modify/access protected system resources. 
CWE-121 21 11 10 Buffer Overflow (Stack) High security risk. 
Malicious attack - execute code/subvert security, System can crash or 
hang, Data corruption. 
CWE-122 19 9 10 Buffer Overflow (Heap) High security risk. 
Malicious attack - execute code/subvert security, System can crash or 
hang, Data corruption. 
CWE-134 10 5 5 Uncontrolled Format String Very high security risk. 
Malicious attack - execute arbitrary code/access confidential 
information, Buffer overflow risk, System can crash or hang. 
Incorrect data representation error. 
CWE-170 10 5 5 Improper Null Termination Security risk. 
Malicious attack - Disclosure of sensitive information/execute arbitrary 
code, Overflow risk due to off-by-one errors, Write-what-where 
condition, System crash, Segmentation fault crash,  
Corrupted data. 
CWE-244 1 1 0 Heap Inspection Security risk. 
Malicious attack - Sensitive information not removed from heap could 
be read by attacker. 
CWE-251 10 5 5 Misused String Manipulation Potential buffer overflow condition leading to security risks, system 
crashes, data corruption, etc. 
CWE-259 19 10 9 Use of Hard-coded Password High security risk. 
Malicous attack - Attacker given access to account. 
CWE-362 4 2 2 Race Condition Possible security risk - if in security-critical mode. 
System crash or hang. 
CWE-367 4 4 0 Time-of-check Time-of-use 
(TOCTOU) Race Condition 
Possible security risk - if in security-critical mode. 
System crash or hang. 
CWE-391 4 2 2 Unchecked Error Condition Security risk - Unexplained behavior hard to attribute to an attack,  
Hard to diagnose unexpected program behavior. 
CWE-401 11 4 7 Memory Leak Possible security risk if attacker triggers a memory leak causing denial-
of-service attack, Memory not released after last use - program can 
crash or hang when memory is too low, Data corruption or loss of data. 
CWE-411 2 1 1 Resource Locking Possible security risk, Inability to control access to resources. 
CWE-412 2 2 0 Unrestricted Externally 
Accessible Lock 
Possible security risk if attacker gains control of lock, Denial-of-
service. 
CWE-415 10 6 4 Double Free Security risk. 
Malicious attack - execute arbitrary code, Write-what-where condition, 
Corrupted data, data loss. 
CWE-416 10 6 4 Use After Free Security risk. 
Malicious attack - execute arbitrary code. 
Write-what-where condition. 
Invalid or corrupt data. 
CWE-457 5 3 2 Use of Uninitialized Variable High security risk - can contain previously-used memory. 
Unpredictable or unintended system behavior, Possible data loss. 
CWE-468 4 2 2 Incorrect Pointer Scaling Security risk. 
Potential for buffer overflow, Corrupt data or data loss, System may 
crash or hang. 
CWE-476 15 7 8 NULL Pointer Dereference Medium security risk - if combined with other flaws. 
Failure of software - crash or exit, Invalid data, possible data loss. 
CWE-489 2 1 1 Leftover Debug Code Security risk - sensitive information may be accessed by attacker. 
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have serious consequences. Table I summarizes the test 
cases and corresponding risks. 
 
Flawfinder, Cppcheck, and Yasca are evaluated on 
detection rate and detection accuracy, and are 
benchmarked by the SAMATE Flaw Classification 
Schema.  Detection rate measures the ability to accurately 
identify the weaknesses in the source code.  There are 4 
categories: true positive, false positive, true negative, and 
false negative.  True positive is when true errors/flaws 
were detected and reported correctly.  False positive is 
when errors were reported when there were actually none.  
True negative is when no errors were found, because the 
source was in fact error/flaw-free.   False negative is 
when existing flaws were not detected.  Detection 
accuracy indicates the ability to detect the error correctly 
according to the following criteria: high, medium, low, 
and none.  High accuracy is when a tool could detect 
flaws correctly in more than 70% of the cases.  Medium 
accuracy is when a tool could detect flaws correctly in 
40% to 69% of the cases.  Low accuracy is when a tool 
could detect flaws correctly in less than 40% of the cases.  
None accuracy is when a tool was not able to detect any 
existing flaws at all.  Results are as follows. 
 
Flawfinder reported a total of 156 flaws in 79 of the 
117 bad source files, but was unable to detect flaws in the 
remaining 38 bad files. Flawfinder correctly detected 68% 
of files with true errors, but also had a high false positive 
rate of 60%. The tool detected a total of 92 (with 42 of 
level 2 and higher) flaws in 50 of the 108 good files.  At 
the default setting of security flaw level 2 Flawfinder was 
able to detect flaws in all but five flaw classes; including 
memory leaks and buffer overflows.  When the security 
flaw level was set to 1, Flawfinder could detect all flaw 
classes except CWE-457 and CWE-468. 
Due to its design to reduce the false positive rate, 
Cppchecker missed many true flaws in the test cases.  
Cppcheck failed to detect any flaws in 16 of the 23 flaw 
classes.  Among the ones being detected, Cppcheck 
reported flaws in 32% of the bad source files with a false 
positive rate of 16%.  Cppcheck detected 25% of test 
cases with memory leak flaws.  And Cppcheck caught 
44% of the heap overflow cases, 18% of the stack 
overflow cases, 40% of the OS command injection cases, 
and 29% of the null pointer dereference cases. 
 
Yasca reported a total of 270 flaws in 117 bad test files 
and another 212 flaws in the 108 good test files. Yasca 
reported 73% of all known flaws; the highest of the three 
tools. The false positive rate was high as well at 67%.  Of 
the true flaws that were detected, the RATS plug-in 
detected 113 flaws in 70 test cases. The Antic and Yasca 
plug-in detected a dozen flaws between them. The GREP 
plug-in detected 98 flaws in 51 test cases.  These plug-ins 
worked nicely together and accomplished more detections 
than they would have separately.  Yasca accurately 
detected 100% of the known flaws in nine of the flaw 
TABLE II 
DETECTION RATE 
Tool True Positives False Negatives False Positives True Negatives 
CPPCHECK 32% 68% 16% 84% 
FLAWFINDER 68% (54%) 32% (46%) 60% (46%) 40% (54%) 




SAMATE ERROR CODE FLAW CPPCHECK FLAWFINDER YASCA 
CWE-078 OS Command Injection Medium High High 
CWE-079 Cross-site scripting XSS Low Medium Medium 
CWE-089 SQL Injection None Medium Medium 
CWE-099 Resource Injection None High High 
CWE-121 Buffer Overflow (Stack) Low High High 
CWE-122 Buffer Overflow (Heap)  Medium Medium High 
CWE-134 Uncontrolled Format String None High High 
CWE-170 Improper Null Termination None High High 
CWE-244 Heap Inspection None None High 
CWE-251 String Management None High High 
CWE-259 Hard-Coded Password None None Low 
CWE-362 Race Condition None Medium Medium 
CWE-367 TOUTOU Race Condition None High Medium 
CWE-391 Unchecked Error Condition None Medium High 
CWE-401 Memory Leak Low Low Medium 
CWE-411 Resource Locking None High None 
CWE-412 Unrestricted Lock on Critical Resource None High None 
CWE-415 Double Free Low Low Low 
CWE-416 Use After Free None Medium High 
CWE-457 Use of Uninitialized Variable None None Low 
CWE-468 Incorrect Pointer Scaling None None None 
CWE-476 Null Pointer Dereference Low Low Low 
CWE-489 Leftover Debug Code None None High 
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classes, and was very effective in the recognition of buffer 




Table II summarizes the detection rates among 
Flawfinder, Cppcheck, and Yasca.  And Table III presents 
the detection accuracy among these three tools.  Flawfinder 
was shown to be the easiest to modify and extend.  
Cppcheck provided an easy-to-use GUI interface that may 
be attractive to novices.  Yasca provided the most accurate 
results, and its hyperlinked HTML report was the most 
useful and versatile.  Open source tools are experimental in 
nature.  If used early in the software development process, 
these tools can catch common errors and offer suggestions 
for improvement.  For small and/or educational 
developments, these tools can be particularly valuable. 
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